Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) appears to have seized control of the country’s key decision-making process with its hardline approach, by answering only to the supreme leader and overruling the civilian leaders, operating with growing autonomy amid a pause in the ongoing Iran war.
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IRGC commander Ahmad Vahidi is now reportedly making military and political decisions alongside Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, according to the Washington-based think tank the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and US intelligence assessments.
Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf — who led the first round of negotiations with the US in Islamabad and was singled out by US President Donald Trump halfway into the war as Washington’s interlocutor — and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi cannot make decisions without the IRGC’s approval, according to the reports.
Vahidi has already hinted at holding key levers of power, stating that under wartime conditions, all critical positions must be chosen and managed directly by the Revolutionary Guards, according to Iran International media outlet.
President Masoud Pezeshkian has seemingly been blocked from key decisions. On 25 March, he was forced to appoint Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council after IRGC commanders, particularly Vahidi, demanded it, reports claim.
The appointment came after the killing of Zolghadr’s predecessor and Tehran’s longtime powerbroker Ali Larijani and despite objections from civilian officials.
When Araghchi announced last Friday that the Strait of Hormuz would be reopened to commercial shipping, hardline commentators and state media attacked him, indicating that he cannot make such a decision by himself.
Just the day after, the IRGC declared the Strait closed again, overruling the foreign minister.
What is the IRGC, and how can a paramilitary corps wield so much power?
Guerrilla tactics and ideological loyalty
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was established on 22 April 1979, by direct order of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
Created months after the Islamic revolution, it operated in parallel with the conventional army inherited from the Pahlavi era, which was essentially decimated after a purge of any potential shah loyalists.
The military vacuum had to be filled given existing and rising tensions with Iran’s neighbours, so the Tehran regime built the IRGC on revolutionary zeal and complete ideological loyalty, not formal military training.
It was designed to deploy guerrilla tactics, asymmetric warfare and volunteer forces recruited through the Basij-e Mostazafan or Basij militia, which later controlled street protests.
Shortly after its formation, Iran entered an eight-year war with Iraq under Saddam Hussein, which further strengthened the IRGC.
Commanders rose rapidly through the ranks at much younger ages than army officers. Ghalibaf, a former IRGC brigadier general, said he commanded a division at around 19 or 20.
About two years after its formation, Mohsen Rezaei was appointed commander-in-chief by Khomeini at 28 and held the role for 16 years.
Rezaei later entered politics and ran for the presidency several times without success. He was succeeded by Yahya Rahim Safavi and then by Mohammad Ali Jafari.
Jafari led the IRGC during the disputed 2009 presidential election and the re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. As a former IRGC member, Ahmadinejad appointed many Guards figures to key government positions. IRGC and Basij forces crushed the protests that followed.
Shortly after the Iran-Iraq war began, IRGC-linked forces started operating in Lebanon, where they helped establish Hezbollah in the early 1980s.
The IRGC Quds Force — the branch tasked with unconventional warfare and intelligence operations — later supported the Syrian government during the civil war, became involved in post-Hussein Iraq fighting for influence in the south of the country, including operations against the so-called Islamic State terrorist group. It also trained Houthi forces in Yemen.
The Quds Force also provides funding, training and weapons to Hamas in Gaza.
According to international media reports, the IRGC was in charge of delivering and deploying drones and military support to Russia in its ongoing all-out war in Ukraine.
Economic force reaching far-flung places
After Iran finally accepted the UN Security Council resolution in 1988 to end the war with Iraq, the IRGC entered a new phase. During reconstruction under then-President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, it expanded into the economy.
The creation of the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters marked the beginning of its transformation into a major economic actor.
This created patronage networks and the “aghazadeh” upper class, a term used to describe the children of revolutionary elites who often enjoy a privileged and sometimes very lavish life.
The IRGC also expanded beyond Iran’s borders with significant financial resources. It grew across the region and into parts of Latin America, particularly Venezuela.
Article 150 of the Iranian Constitution says the IRGC exists to safeguard the revolution and its achievements.
Yet its former commander Mohammad Ali Jafari stated in a 2016 interview that the IRGC is not merely a conventional military force, but an institution tasked with protecting the political system and confronting internal threats.
Meanwhile, critics say the institution’s name and symbols have little to do with Iran, and are instead meant to represent its mission to export the Islamic Revolution beyond national borders.
The IRGC operates as a vast network, including independent financial and banking institutions, scientific and academic centres for training personnel, and provincial branches and Basij bases across the country.
Structure and strategic reach
The IRGC developed into a fully-fledged parallel army consisting of five main branches: Ground Forces, Navy, Aerospace Force —notably responsible for missile capabilities — Basij, and the Quds Force.
Under Major General Qasem Soleimani, it became one of the most influential military actors in the Middle East. His killing in a US strike near Baghdad airport in 2020 was a major blow.
The IRGC, including the Quds Force and affiliated networks, has long been under extensive international sanctions, particularly from the US.
In February 2026 — just days before the second Israeli-US assault on Iran — the Council of the European Union designated the IRGC as a terrorist organisation, imposing asset freezes and financial restrictions across EU member states.
There is no reliable, up-to-date figure for IRGC personnel. However, official statements indicate that its training and mobilisation capacity — particularly through coordination units, ideological-political structures and Basij networks — can exceed 220,000 individuals annually.
Leadership shifts after heavy losses
In recent times, the IRGC’s leadership was reshuffled multiple times, following the deaths of key commanders targeted by either Israel or the US.
In 2020, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei appointed Major General Hossein Salami as head of the IRGC. Salami was killed in Israeli strikes in June 2025.
His successor, Major General Mohammad Pakpour, was killed in joint US-Israeli strikes on 28 February, alongside Khamenei himself.
Command of the IRGC passed to Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi, who reportedly maintains close ties with Khamenei’s son and the new Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei.
Vahidi served as Iran’s first IRGC Quds Force commander between 1988 and 1997. He has also held civilian posts, serving as defence minister under Ahmadinejad and interior minister under President Ebrahim Raisi.
Argentina’s highest court formally charged Vahidi for the 1994 attack on the AMIA Jewish Community centre in Buenos Aires and issued an Interpol arrest warrant against him.
Vahidi was one of the senior IRGC commanders who pushed the Assembly of Experts to select Mojtaba Khamenei as ayatollah back in March, according to reports.
IRGC now at centre of power
Despite experiencing heavy losses and its decapitation following the death of Ali Khamenei, the IRGC kept operating and endured nearly two months of war against two major military powers without collapsing.
Trump has claimed success in military operations against Iran and stated Tehran went through a regime change.
Yet, due to its decentralised nature, the IRGC managed to block the Strait of Hormuz, disrupting global energy and food markets.
Iran’s former security chief Ali Larijani reorganised the IRGC by structuring it into autonomous regional headquarters that listen to the supreme leader’s orders only and are empowered to make their own decisions away from the central Tehran civilian leadership.
With the death of the elder Khamenei, the system now appears less dependent on a single figure and more reliant on a network of interconnected actors with shared interests, in what Iran insiders see as a shift from a cleric-dominated system to a more IRGC-centric power structure.
Within this system, religious enforcement of socially restrictive policies — particularly compulsory hijab, as well as limitations on dancing, nightlife and alcohol consumption — appears to be less of a priority.
Even though it is an ideological institution itself, the IRGC is now redefining its role beyond the traditional framework of clerical rule (Velayat-e-Faqih), positioning itself as a central and autonomous force within Iran’s power structure.
